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FROM PICKERING TO CEBALLOS:
THE DEMISE OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE
Jessica Reed*
INTRODUCTION
The Los Angeles Police Department suffered an enormous
loss of public confidence when the "Rampart" corruption scandal
came to the fore in the fall of 1999.1 Officer testimony revealed
drug deals, perjury, and at least one instance of disturbing conduct
in which an officer handcuffed a member of a local gang, shot him,
and then planted the gun on the now-paralyzed victim to avoid
blame.2 Gil Garcetti, then Los Angeles District Attorney,3 at-
tempted to sustain some public trust as he promised to thoroughly
* A graduate of the City University of New York School of Law in 2007. The Au-
thor offers heartfelt thanks to Nancie Flaxman (Mama), John Reed (Dadjio), and
John Daniel Clifton (Ubbo). Lily Goetz, Karuna Patel, Caitlin/Owen Daniel-Mc-
Carter, Ruthann Robson, and Andrea McArdle: thank goodness you do not listen
when told to hold your tongues.
I The scandal had been extensive:
In March 2000 .. . the interest of the LA community in preventing,
disclosing, and rectifying police misconduct was at its zenith. Six
months earlier, LA had been shaken by one of the worst police scandals
in U.S. history, involving corruption and widespread abuses by an anti-
gang unit of the LA Police Department (LAPD) assigned to the Ram-
part area of the city. The Rampart scandal broke in mid-September
1999, when a member of the Rampart unit, Rafael Perez, then being
tried on drug-theft charges, revealed in exchange for leniency that he
and another officer had shot an unarmed man and planted a gun on
him to cover it up .... Perez implicated dozens of officers in the Ram-
part unit in criminal activities and serious acts of misconduct, including
attempted murder, planting evidence, false imprisonment, beatings,
theft of money and drugs, unauthorized searches, obstruction ofjustice,
false police reports, and perjury ....
Brief for Respondent at 1-2, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006) (No. 04-473)
[hereinafter Brief for Respondent] (internal citations omitted). But see John Mills,
Op-Ed., Voices/A Forum for Community Issues, Community Debate on the Rampart Scan-
dal: The Police Must Retain Order .... L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1999, at B9 ("The LAPD is
caught in the middle.").
2 See, e.g., Rich Connell & RobertJ. Lopez, Rampart Probe May Put Gang Injunction
at Risk: LAPD Officers Testimony Called Fabricated, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1999, at Al; see
also Matt Latt & Scott Glover, FBI Launches Probe into Rampart Scanda4 L.A. TIMES, Feb.
24, 2000, at Al.
3 Gil Garcetti was the Los Angeles District Attorney from 1992-2000. Los Angeles
County District Attorney's Office, Former Los Angeles County District Attorneys,
http://da.co.la.ca.us/history/default.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2007).
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investigate the charges.4
Just one year later Richard Ceballos, a Los Angeles Assistant
District Attorney who had alerted his supervisors to possible police
misconduct, charged his employers with retaliation for activity pro-
tected by the First Amendment.5 His case eventually changed pub-
lic employee free speech doctrine so radically as to take the
government employee out of the picture entirely.
According to public employee6 free speech doctrine at the
time Ceballos initiated his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, the Connick-Pick-
eying test required first an inquiry into whether the speech per-
tained to a matter of public concern.7 If the speech at issue were
classified as merely routine employment speech, with no impor-
tance to the public, then it received no First Amendment protec-
tion and the inquiry ended there.' If the memo were judged
instead to be important to other citizens, then its speaker might
4 Garcetti made numerous public statements indicating an ensuing, intensive in-
vestigation, and expressing remorse at the devastation caused by the scandal. One
such statement seems ironic, considering his later actions against Ceballos: "I have
been a prosecutor for over [thirty] years. I know the terrible cost to society and the
justice system if even one cop goes bad. The credibility of all law enforcement be-
comes immediately suspect. That's why this corruption investigation is so vitally im-
portant to everyone." Greta Van Susteren, Roger Cossack & Charles Feldman, L.A.
Police Turns Investigative Eye on Men and Women in Blue (CNN television broadcast Sept.
24, 1999).
5 Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 8.
6 Within this Note "government employee" and "public employee" will be used
interchangeably to remind the reader of the inherent tension between working for
the State and working as a citizen for one's peers-a conflict apparent throughout the
doctrine of public employee free speech protections.
7 In Pickering, the Court refused to concretize the definition of public concern
due to the "enormous variety of fact situations in which critical statements by ...
public employees may be thought by their superiors ... to furnish grounds for dismis-
sal, we do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general
standard against which all statements may bejudged." Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391
U.S. 563, 569 (1968). Yet,Justice Marshall did articulate the heft public concern could
carry when he wrote that "public interest in having free and unhindered debate on
matters of public importance [is] the core value of the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment.. . ." Id. at 573. Justice White reiterated this worth fifteen years later in
Connick: "Speech on public issues occupies the 'highest rung of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values,' and is entitled to special protection." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 145 (1983) (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913
(1982)); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980).
8 Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 ("[W]hen a public employee speaks ... not as a citizen
upon matters of public concern . . . a federal court is not the appropriate forum in
which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly
in reaction to the employee's behavior." (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-50
(1976) (reasoning that federal courts are not the proper forum for employment deci-
sions when no constitutionally protected right is at issue))).
Public Employee Free Speech Doctrine
retain First Amendment protection.9 Passing the public concern
hurdle, next the speech at issue was weighed against the govern-
ment's interest in being an efficient employer.'" The govern-
ment's interest in avoiding workplace disruption often outweighed
the individual's First Amendment right to free speech; overcoming
these two barriers-public concern and the balance of interests-
was difficult for employees. 1 Yet, surviving the first two considera-
tions did not guarantee First Amendment protection: the em-
ployee must also have proved that the protected speech "was a
'substantial factor' or ... a 'motivating factor"' in the adverse em-
ployment decision.' 2 If not, the court may have determined that
the employee was justly terminated if the employer could prove "by
a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the
same decision ... even in the absence of the protected conduct."1
A jury never weighed the evidence in Ceballos's case. He
brought his claim in the United States District Court for the Cen-
tral District of California, where it was dismissed at the summary
judgment stage.' 4 The Ninth Circuit reversed. 5 Eventually the Su-
preme Court heard the parties' arguments. 6 In its decision, the
Court shifted public employee free speech doctrine by adding a
bright-line rule that narrowed the group of protected speakers. 17
9 See Hon. D. Duff McKee, Termination or Demotion of a Public Employee in Retaliation
for Speaking out as a Violation of Right of Free Speech. 22 Am. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 10
(2005) (summarizing Supreme Court decisions regarding right of free speech).
10 Connick, 461 U.S. at 149-54.
11 See Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The First
Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1, 55-56 (1990).
12 Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)
(quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 n.21
(1977)).
13 Id.
14 Ceballos v. Garcetti, No. CV 00-11106 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2002), rev'd, 361 F.3d
1168 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
15 Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
16 In fact, the Court heard the arguments twice. Garcetti v. Ceballos was first argued
in front of the Supreme Court on October 12, 2005, during the brief period when
both ChiefJustice John Roberts and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor shared the bench.
See SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES (2006), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.
pdf. AfterJustice O'Connor left the Court and Justice Samuel Alito was sworn in, the
Court decided to rehear the arguments on March 21, 2006. Georgetown University
law professor Martin Lederman explained: "It is likely that Garcetti is the only one of
the 20 [sic] outstanding cases in which Justice O'Connor's vote was determinative[:]
in other words, in which the court is divided 4-4 without her vote." David L. Hudson,
Jr., The Return of the Reargument: Supreme Court to Hear Again a Key Employee Free Speech
Case, 5 No. 1 ABAJ. E-REPORT 1 (Mar. 17, 2006).
17 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
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Justice Kennedy wrote the plurality opinion, holding "that when
public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties,
the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment
purposes and the Constitution does not insulate their communica-
tions from employer discipline."1
8
Part I of this Note will trace the historical development of pub-
lic employee free speech doctrine from its inception in Pickering v.
Board of Education. Part II will relay the factual and procedural his-
tory of Garcetti v. Ceballos, and explain the arguments that both par-
ties made to the Supreme Court. Part III will discuss the Court's
majority and dissenting opinions in Garcetti v. Ceballos. Part IV will
conclude the Note with an argument: by separating government
employees into unrealistic molds of worker-selves and citizen-
selves, the Court's ruling created a compartmentalization that not
only leaves public employees vulnerable to retaliation for exposing
governmental misconduct or inefficiencies, but also neglects the
public's interest in hearing such speech.
I. HISTORICAL/CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom
of speech.., or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances, '"19 and yet,
before 1968, government employees could sufferjob loss and other
retaliation for their speech."z In his infamous iteration of the
right-privilege doctrine at the end of the nineteenth century, 21 Jus-
tice Oliver Wendell Holmes, then serving on the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, opined that "[t]he petitioner may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional
right to be a policeman. '"22 Until the late 1960s, courts echoed
18 Id. at 1960.
19 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
20 See, e.g., Marni M. Zack, Public Employee Free Speech: The Policy Reasons for Rejecting
Per Se Rule Precluding Speech Rights, 46 B.C. L. REv. 893, 895 (2005) (discussing McAu-
liffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892)).
21 For a thorough explanation of the right-privilege doctrine current in 1968, see
William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
22 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). Nearly
thirty years later, Holmes would write about the usefulness of protecting speech to
further democracy's "free trade in ideas." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (HolmesJ., dissenting) ("[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market .... That at any rate is the
theory of our Constitution."). Yet, when the government acts as employer and not as
sovereign, Holmes saw a distinction. Because the employee "takes the employment
[Vol. 11:95
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Holmes's rhetoric23 to quash government workers' petitions for re-
lief from the employment discrimination that often followed their
expressions of unpopular beliefs or affiliations.24
A. The Pickering Balancing Test
In 1968, the Supreme Court broke from Holmes's dogma
when it decided Pickering v. Board of Education, which established
the seminal rule including public employees within the ambit of
the First Amendment right to free speech. 5 Pickerings analysis bal-
ances the government's interest as an employer in efficient control
of the workplace against employees' interests in speaking on public
matters without fear of retaliation.26
Marvin L. Pickering was a public high school teacher in Will
County, Illinois.27 Following the county's failure to approve a pro-
posed tax increase for the school board, Pickering sent a letter to
the local paper criticizing the board's disproportionate allocation
of funds between educational and athletic programs.28 Pickering
signed the letter "as a citizen, taxpayer and voter, not as a teacher,"
because previously, teachers' letters written for publication first
had to receive approval from the superintendent.29 Much to the
dismay of the district school board, the paper published Picker-
on the terms which are offered him[,] .. . the [government] may impose any reasona-
ble condition upon holding offices within its control." McAuliffe, 29 N.E. at 518.
23 Justice Holmes recognized the danger in repeating his well-crafted epigrams: "It
is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases and there-
after for a long time cease to provoke further analysis." Hyde v. United States, 225
U.S. 347, 391 (1912) (Holmes,J., dissenting).
24 E.g., Adler v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (holding that dismissal
from employment in the public school system based on membership in a "subversive
organization" may limit one's choice between membership in the organization and
public employment but does not limit one's right to free speech or association), over-
ruled in part by Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (rejecting the theory
that public employment may be subject to any condition, no matter how unreasona-
ble); see also Washington v. Clark, 84 F. Supp. 964, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ("The Govern-
ment may not imprison a person for making various utterances, but it may, if it sees fit
to do so, dismiss a Government employee who makes such utterances.").
25 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968) (explaining that, because teachers are the members of
the public most likely to have access to information relevant to the school board deci-
sions, "it is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such questions without
fear of retaliatory dismissal").
26 Id. at 568 ("The problem ... is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest
of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it per-
forms through its employees.").
27 Id. at 564.
28 Id. at 566.
29 Id. at 576-78.
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ing's editorial.3" Responding directly to the printed letter, the
board fired Pickering.3 Pickering challenged his dismissal.32 In its
first clear decision for public employees in the field of First
Amendment free speech protections, the Supreme Court found
for the teacher.33
The Court reasoned that Pickering's actions were substantially
similar to those of a citizen because "the fact of [his] employment
[was] only tangentially and insubstantially involved in the subject
matter of the public communication . . . ."" As a teacher, Picker-
ing rarely interacted with members of the school board, and so no
concerns about "maintaining either discipline by immediate super-
iors or harmony among coworkers" were present.3
5
The Court's articulation and application of this doctrine has
been inconsistent nearly since its inception in Pickering. The first
post-Pickering cases protected government employees' free speech,
while subsequent cases have tended to chip away at that right.
36
B. Wat Pickering Taught During its First Fifteen Years: The
Beginning of a Public Employee Free Speech Doctrine
Pickering upheld access to First Amendment protection in rec-
ognition that workers are also citizens and, by virtue of their jobs,
may be able to add vital information to the public discourse that
supports democracy.37  The Supreme Court reaffirmed the
30 Id. at 566.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 566-67.
33 Id. at 574-75.
34 Id. at 574.
35 Id. at 570. "The Pickering Court's decision upholding [Pickering's] First Amend-
ment claim was influenced by the fact that the teacher's public statements had not
adversely affected his working relationship with the objects of his criticism .... Giv-
han v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 439 U.S. 410, 414 n.3 (1979).
36 "Over the past thirty years, the extent of First Amendment protection available
to public employees' speech has resembled a roller coaster." Patricia C. Camvel, Wa-
ters v. Churchill: The Denial of Public Employees' First Amendment Rights, 4 WIDENER J.
PUB. L. 581, 585 (1995). "The history of protecting the speech of government em-
ployees has been one of expansion and subsequent contraction of rights.... [M]any
appellate courts have been busy devising new tools for restricting the speech rights of
government employees." Rosalie Berger Levinson, Superimposing Title VI's Adverse Ac-
tion Requirement on First Amendment Retaliation Claims: A Chilling Prospect for Government
Employee Speech, 79 TUL. L. REv. 669, 672 (2005).
37 Justifications for a strong First Amendment often point to the belief that rigor-
ous debate creates a healthy democracy. See United States v. Associated Press, 52 F.
Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (" [The First Amendment] presupposes that right con-
clusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through
any kind of authoritative selection."); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
270 (1964) ("[D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open
[Vol. 11:95
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strength of this right in 1972 in Peny v. Sindermann, when it held
that summary judgment "without full exploration of the issue"
of a teacher's First Amendment claim against a school was
"improper.""
Professor Sindermann raised both a First Amendment free
speech claim and a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim af-
ter being fired by a junior college for publicly criticizing the
school's Board of Regents. 9 The district court granted summary
judgment for the school because Sindermann was untenured and
therefore an employee at-will.4" Both the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals and the Supreme Court recognized that a lack of tenure was
not dispositive of Sindermann's First Amendment claim because
the reason for Sindermann's termination was "in total dispute."41
The Court recalled that the government "may not deny a benefit to
a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected in-
terests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech."4 2
In 1977, Justice Rehnquist articulated a further question for
courts to ask after applying the Pickering balancing test and finding
for the petitioner. Although this subsequent step did not create a
significant barrier to petitioners, its addition to the rule demon-
strates how the Court built progressive obstacles to accessing the
right. The speech at issue in Mount Healthy City School District Board
of Education v. Doyle was a statement made by an untenured teacher
regarding the school's new dress-code policy for faculty.4 3 Doyle,
angered by the policy, spoke to a local radio personality, who then
repeated the statements on air.44 Although Doyle apologized to the
principal and recognized the impropriety of the venue for first ex-
pressing his criticism, the principal recommended that the school
.... .). This belief presupposes that there is a truth to be revealed by adding more
speech to the pot. See William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First
Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1 (1995) (arguing that the search for truth
remains the most viable justification for freedom of speech under the First Amend-
ment). But see Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. Riv. 119, 141
(1989) (proffering a study of the relationships between multiple First Amendment
justifications and arguing that "[a] good answer to many social problems depends not
so much on the discovery of 'true principles' as on an accommodation of competing
interests and desires.").
38 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972).
39 Id. at 594-95.
40 Id. at 596.
41 Id. (quoting Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939, 943 (5th Cir. 1970)).
42 Id. at 597.
43 429 U.S. 274, 282 (1977).
44 Id.
2007]
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board not rehire the teacher.4 5 Doyle claimed this action infringed
his First Amendment right to free speech.4 6
The Court agreed with Doyle that his speech received First
Amendment protection but held that a further inquiry was re-
quired.4" "[T1 he District Court should have gone on to determine
whether the Board had shown by a preponderance of the evidence
that it would have reached the same decision as to respondent's
reemployment even in the absence of the protected conduct.14
Causation had entered the rule.49
Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, decided
eleven years after Pickering and just shortly after Mount Healthy, ex-
tended the protection of speech to private conversations between
government employees and their superiors, thus swinging the
scope of the right back into the employee's domain.5" The plain-
tiff, Bessie Givhan, had been terminated from her position as ajun-
ior high school teacher shortly after she voiced concerns to her
superior regarding a racially discriminatory school policy.51 The
district court agreed that her speech was protected, but the Fifth
Circuit reversed, finding that "because [Givhan] had privately ex-
pressed her complaints and opinions to the principal, her expres-
sion was not protected under the First Amendment."52  The
Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's holding and remanded
it for further proceedings: "Neither the [First] Amendment itself
nor our decisions indicate that this freedom [of speech] is lost to
the public employee who arranges to communicate privately with
his employer rather than spread his views before the public."53 Pri-
vate conversations, which may contain issues of public concern, will
burden an employer's interest in efficiency when interpersonal
conflicts arise, but they may not be excluded per se from First
Amendment protection simply because they were not made di-
rectly to the public.54
45 Id.
46 Id. at 276.
47 The Court also agreed with the district court that the speech was protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 284.
48 Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
49 See Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector Work-
place, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 17-20 (1987) (discussing the hurdle causation places
before a plaintiff).
50 Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
51 Id. at 411-13.
52 Id. at 413.
53 Id. at 415-16.
54 Rehnquist further explained this public-private doctrinal distinction:
Although the First Amendment's protection of government employees
[Vol. 11:95
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C. Limiting Pickering's Speech-Protective Authority
The Court's ruling in Connick v. Myers5 marked the erosion of
speech protections for employees once again.56 After Connick, gov-
ernment employees still 'retained some First Amendment protec-
tion, but courts more heavily weighed the context of the speech
and the employee's role at the time.57 While Mount Healthy added
an inquiry after the balancing test, the Court in Connick held that a
threshold determination that the speech be of public concern
must be made before the court could move on to a Pickering
balance.58
Connick presented the issue of whether a questionnaire circu-
lated within an office and about purely internal office issues could
be protected as a matter of public concern by the First Amend-
ment.59 Sheila Myers was employed as an Assistant District Attor-
ney under Harry Connick, the District Attorney for Orleans
Parish.6 ° Much to her dismay, Myers was going to be transferred to
another location.6 ' A superior told her that she held a minority
opinion in opposing the office policy on transfers.62 Myers de-
cided to research that assertion further and thus created the
extends to private as well as public expression, striking the Pickering bal-
ance in each context may involve different considerations. When a
teacher speaks publicly, it is generally the content of his statements that
must be assessed to determine whether they "in any way either impeded
the teacher's proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom or
... interfered with the regular operation of the schools generally."...
Private expression, however, may in some situations bring additional
factors to the Pickering calculus. When a government employee person-
ally confronts his immediate superior, the employing agency's institu-
tional efficiency may be threatened not only by the content of the
employee's message but also by the manner, time, and place in which it
is delivered.
Id. at 415 n.4 (citation omitted).
55 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (5-4 decision).
56 SeeJonathan Alen Marks, Connick v. Myers: Narrowing the Scope of Protected Speech
for Public Employees, 5 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 337 (1984). Marks listed the potential
threefold impact: qualified employees will avoid public employment so as to avoid
reduced constitutional protections, limiting public employees' speech will cause a loss
in governmental efficiency, and the specter of adverse employment actions will si-
lence public employees. Id. at 361.
57 This limitation of a public employee's right to free speech prompted one author
to argue that because Connick exempts so much speech from protection, it is a "doctri-
nal failure." Jeffrey A. Shooman, The Speech of Public Employees Outside the Workplace:
Towards a New Framework, 36 SETON HALL L. REv. 1341, 1363 (2006).
58 Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
59 Id. at 141.
60 Id. at 140.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 141.
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speech at issue, a questionnaire. 61 Shortly after Myers distributed
the questionnaire, a First Assistant District Attorney told Connick
that Myers was fomenting a "mini-insurrection."6 Connick subse-
quently fired Myers for her refusal to accept the transfer, and
stated that her distribution of the questionnaire was an act of
insubordination.65
Myers brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that
she had been fired in retaliation for the exercise of a constitution-
ally protected right-free speech.6 6 The district court agreed with
Myers and ordered her reinstated with back pay, damages, and at-
torneys' fees.6 7 Connick appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which af-
firmed.68 The Supreme Court granted Connick's writ of certiorari.
The Court focused on the language in Pickering that explained
both why public employees' right to free soeech cannot be in-
fringed merely because they are employed by the government and
why that protection must be limited.69 Pickerings:
repeated emphasis .. .on the right of a public employee "as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern" ....
reflects both the historical evolvement of the rights of public
employees, and the common sense realization that government
offices could not function if every employment decision became
a constitutional matter.70
Thus, according to Connick, public employees who raise claims
under the First Amendment must distinguish their speech as relat-
ing to a matter of public concern and not a solely personal expres-
sion, such as a workplace grievance.7' Under this standard, a court
must look into all of the facts presented in order to make the dis-
tinction. "Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of
public concern must be determined by the content, form, and con-
text of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record." 72 The
Connick court decided that Myers's "questionnaire touched upon
matters of public concern in only a most limited sense; her survey
... is most accurately characterized as an employee grievance con-
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 141-42.
68 Id. at 142.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 143.
71 Id. at 147.
72 Id. at 147-48.
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cerning internal office policy." 73 As such, the Court held that My-
ers's speech failed the first step in the inquiry. The Court did not
have to use the Pickering balancing test because the speech-not a
matter of public concern-would automatically receive no First
Amendment protection under the Court's public employee speech
jurisprudence. 4
The subsequent case in this line, Rankin v. McPherson, involved
speech overheard by a coworker, and while it did not shift the doc-
trine, it presents an example of the Court weighing the employee's
interest against the employer's and finding for the employee.75
Ardith McPherson, conversing with a coworker in the county con-
stable's office about the failed attempt on Ronald Reagan's life,
stated, "[1]f they go for him again, I hope they get him. '76 Another
coworker overheard her statement and reported it to the em-
ployer, Rankin.7 7 McPherson was fired that afternoon.78 Justice
Marshall authored the Court's opinion, and found the speech to
be a matter of public concern that, when balanced against the em-
ployer's interest in efficiency, weighed in favor of the employee. 79
The Rankin decision suggests that political conversations
among employees, in and outside of workplace responsibilities, are
conversations that add to public debate and enliven democracy.80
Justice Marshall offers a relevant and important advisement, stating
"[v] igilance is necessary to ensure that public employers do not use
authority over employees to silence discourse, not because it ham-
73 Id. at 154.
74 Id.
75 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (5-4 decision).
76 Id. at 381.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 382.
79 Id. at 390-92.
80 See generally Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REv. 885,
895-99 (2006) (discussing the democratic benefits of transparency in government
and reviewing key scholars of various theories of democracy). Fenster writes: "Ulti-
mately, modern political theory and open government legislation assume trans-
parency can operate as a force capable of establishing a public and a public sphere
itself, creating legitimate government and then legitimating the actions of the govern-
ment that it creates by enabling informed individual choice and collective, demo-
cratic decisionmaking." Id. at 899. See also CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER:
How WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY (2003) (discussing the
role of the workplace in enriching the diverse democracy that is United States soci-
ety). Public discourse and political deliberation legitimize democratic decisionmak-
ing, encourage moral obligation of the losers to abide by majority decisions they
oppose and serve to form cooperative bonds among diverse individuals. Estlund ar-
gues that conversations among co-workers should and do constitute public discourse
and a mode of participation in civil society in a regular and vital way. See id. at 118-24.
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pers public functions but simply because superiors disagree with
the content of employees' speech."81 Mere disagreement with an
employee's speech cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny as a
reason for disciplinary action.
Waters v. Churchill addressed what to do when the actual con-
tent of the speech is in dispute.12 Churchill, an employee in the
obstetrics department of a public hospital, was fired for a conversa-
tion she had with another nurse. 3 A coworker who overheard part
of the conversation reported it to Churchill's supervisor, Waters. 4
Waters contended that Churchill had been negatively commenting
on Waters and on her department in general.85 Churchill main-
tained that she was speaking about the hospital's "cross-training"
policy 6 and about her concern that it affected patient safety.87
Churchill was fired for the statements made during this conversa-
tion.88 She followed the hospital's internal procedures for appeal-
ing the employment decision, but her grievance was rejected. 89
This led her to bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, charging an in-
fringement of her First Amendment right to freedom of speech.9 °
The district court granted summary judgment for the em-
ployer finding that the speech did not touch on a matter of public
concern, regardless of whose version was to be believed. The Sev-
enth Circuit reversed, holding that the speech did qualify as a sub-
ject of public concern, and that the actual content of the speech
should be at issue-not what the employer believed the speech to
be.9 2 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict
among the circuits regarding what to do when the content of the
speech itself is at issue.93
Justice O'Connor reminded the Court that "the First Amend-
ment creates a strong presumption against punishing protected
81 Rankin, 483 U.S. at 384.
82 Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 664 (1994) (plurality opinion).
83 Id.
84 Id. at 665.
85 Id.
86 This policy allowed nurses to work at another location in the hospital when
their usual station was overstaffed. Id. at 666.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 664.
89 Id. at 666-67.
90 Id. at 667. In her § 1983 action, Churchill claimed that her employer violated
her First Amendment rights because her speech was protected under Connick. Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 667-68.
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speech even inadvertently . . . -04 In Waters, there existed a few
versions of the speech at issue-the employee's version, the gov-
ernment employer's version, and the version believed by the trier
of fact. The question of whom to believe, and why, led the Court
to rearticulate an important distinction between the government's
two roles at play in public speech conflicts: the government-as-sov-
ereign and the government-as-employer.95 "The government's in-
terest in achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible
is elevated from a relatively subordinate interest when it acts as
sovereign to a significant one when it acts as employer." 6 When
acting as sovereign, the government must decide the speech it may
suppress with care, but when acting as an employer, the demand
for efficiency in the government's business allows for a relaxed
standard. Hence, "[t]he government cannot restrict the speech
of the public at large just in the name of efficiency. But where
the government is employing someone for the very purpose of
effectively achieving its goals, such restrictions may well be
appropriate. 9 7
In order to promote efficiency and yet still protect against a
possible invasion of government employees' free speech, the Court
offered a standard of reasonableness. "If an employment action is
based on what an employee supposedly said, and a reasonable su-
pervisor would recognize that there is a substantial likelihood that
what was actually said was protected, the manager must tread with a
certain amount of care."9 8 Waters addressed the limited scenario of
an employer engaging in a negative employment action because of
an erroneous belief about an employee's speech. The employer
will not be held liable if that erroneous belief is reasonable.
In 1994 the Court extended First Amendment free speech
protection to at-will, independent contractors who work for the
government. Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr involved pub-
lic comments that a solid-waste hauler made against his employer. 9
The contractor criticized the county's landfill user rates and
claimed it mismanaged taxpayer funds."'° Eventually the Board
succeeded in voting to negate its contract with Umbehr. Umbehr
94 Id. at 670.
95 Id. at 671 (revisiting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)).
96 Id. at 675.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 677.
99 518 U.S. 668, 671 (1996).
100 Id.
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brought suit charging retaliation for protected speech.1 'O The
Court decided that "independent contractors are protected, and
... the Pickering balancing test, adjusted to weigh the government's
interests as contractor rather than as employer, determines the ex-
tent of their protection."1 °2 The Court agreed with the lower court
holding and remanded the case for a decision using the test as
articulated above.1 3
The speech at issue in San Diego v. Roe, decided in 2004, oc-
curred outside of the workplace and was mostly unrelated to work: a
police officer sold videos of himself stripping and masturbating
while wearing a generic police uniform.' 4 He filmed himself and
sold the videos-the speech at issue-on eBay while off-duty.'0 5
Following an internal investigation, Roe's supervisor ordered him
to cease his side business.'0 6 After Roe did not fully comply, and
following subsequent discipline, he was dismissed from the police
force. 0 7 The Supreme Court, per curiam,'l 8 found that Roe's ex-
pression did "not qualify as a matter of public concern under any
view of the public concern test."'0 9 This decision did not move the
doctrine, but the Court did offer a definition of public concern:
"something that is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a
subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public
at the time of publication."" 0 Accordingly, Roe's videos met none
of these definitions.
Garcetti v. Ceballos entered the public employee free speech
doctrine at this point, where there existed several steps in the test
to determine whether there had been a violation of an employee's
First Amendment right. To summarize, courts must first inquire
whether the speech is of public concern, by considering the entire
record and the speech's content, form, and context."1 Connick ex-
plained this as a separation of speech into two categories: speech
101 Id. at 671-72.
102 Id. at 673.
103 Id. at 685.
104 543 U.S. 77, 78 (2004).
105 Id. at 78, 80.
106 Id. at 79.
107 Id.
108 Not only was the case decided per curiam, but it was also decided purely on the
parties' briefs. Shooman, supra note 57, at 1359.
109 Roe, 543 U.S. at 84.
110 Id. at 83-84. One scholar commented that the Court, in focusing on the detri-
ment and harm to the San Diego Police Department, implicitly applied the Pickering
balancing test, thereby not addressing whether speech made outside of the workplace
and unrelated to one'sjob should be protected. Shooman, supra note 57, at 1362-63.
111 Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.
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that is of public import and speech that is merely personal.' 12 If
the speech passes this public concern/import threshold, the analy-
sis moves to the Pickering balance: whether the employee's interest
in free speech outweighs the employer's interest in maintaining an
efficient operation. 13 If the employee's protections are deemed to
outweigh the employer's interest, the employer may still prevail if it
can prove that the adverse employment action would have oc-
curred outside of the protected conduct.
II. BACKGROUND TO GARCETTi v. CEBALLOS
A. Factual History
Richard Ceballos had been a deputy district attorney in Los
Angeles County for eleven years and had been acting in a supervi-
sory role when the Rampart scandal unfolded. 14 He was subse-
quently approached by defense attorney Richard Escobedo in
February 2000."' Escobedo expressed his concern about the con-
stitutionality of a particular search, specifically doubting the verac-
ity of the deputies' testimony as to the evidence offered in support
of the warrant.' 16 He "told Ceballos that he believed that one of
the arresting deputy sheriffs may have lied in a search warrant affi-
davit.""' 7 Ceballos decided to investigate the allegation himself,
which entailed, inter alia, driving to the location described in the
warrant and looking at what had been described in the warrant as a
driveway. 18 This investigation led Ceballos to believe that the dep-
112 Id. at 147.
113 Id. at 150. The Court did not provide a static weight to each side of the balance.
"[T] he State's burden in justifying a particular discharge varies depending upon the
nature of the employee's expression. Although such particularized balancing is diffi-
cult, the courts must reach the most appropriate balance of the competing interests."
Id. Some scholars believe the balance is skewed towards the employer by demanding
a threshold before the Pickering test. See, e.g., Cynthia KY. Lee, Freedom of Speech in the
Public Workplace: A Comment on the Public Concern Requirement, 76 CAL. L. REv. 1109
(1988). "By requiring the public employee to show that his speech was of public
concern, the Supreme Court has demonstrated a disproportionate concern for the
government employer's interest in managing the workplace." Id. at 1121.
114 See Appellant's Opening Brief at 4, Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir.
2004) (No. 02-55418). For a thorough exploration of the scandal, see Erwin Chemer-
insky, An Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police Department's Board of Inquiry Report
on the Rampart Scandal, 34 Lov. L.A. L. Ritv. 545, 552-53 (2001) (responding to the
LAPD's Board of Inquiry-issued report, titled Rampart Area Corruption Incident,
Chemerinsky concludes that the LAPD is "seriously diseased and the same culture
that gave rise to the Rampart scandal will lead to others unless it is cured.").
115 Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 114, at 4-5.
116 Id. at 4-5.
117 Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1171.
118 When deposed, Ceballos described his actions:
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uty sheriff had, "at the least, grossly misrepresented the facts."119
Ceballos spoke to his immediate supervisors, Frank Sundstedt
and Carol Najera, about his findings. 2 ° The two shared his con-
cern, and so Ceballos prepared a memorandum dated March 2,
2000, which he believed would lead to a dismissal of the case. 1 21
Instead, Sundstedt and Najera instructed Ceballos to rewrite the
memo to sound less accusatory of the sheriff's department. 122
Ceballos disagreed with their directions, believing that a rewrite
would be improper. 23 He told them that he believed the "appro-
priate course was to redact or black out the objectional [sic] ...
portions of [his] memo that were clearly work product, and ... to
then turn over that portion to the defense in its present form so
that they would clearly know that there had been some redac-
tion."'2 4 Yet, Ceballos's superiors were insistent, and so he com-
plied with their directions. 25
One week after Ceballos presented a more sanitized version of
the memo, he joined Sundstedt and Najera for a meeting with a
lieutenant from the Sheriff's Department to discuss the case. 1 26 In
the meantime, the defendant had moved to traverse the search
warrant. 27 Up until this point Ceballos assumed that the case was
going to be dismissed because he believed the search warrant con-
I reviewed the search warrant in detail, and paid particular attention to
the . . . description of the property, and then [the defense attorney]
provided photographs as well as a videotape depicting the area in ques-
tion, and I remember comparing the photographs and the videotape
with the description of the warrant and noticing that there was an obvi-
ous difference. There was clearly a mischaracterization of the descrip-
tion of the property. The way they had described it in the warrant did
not at all match what the photographs were depicting.
Joint Appendix, 2005 WL 16203385, at *32, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951
(2006).
119 Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1171.
120 Id.
121 Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 114, at 5.
122 Id. (specifically, "Sundstedt [was] concerned with the Sheriff's Department's re-
action to the report..."); see alsoJim Crogan, Soft on Crime Fighters: Higher-ups Ignored
Problems with Drug Case, Prosecutor Alleges, L.A. WEEKLY NEWS, Dec. 20, 2000, available at
http://www.laweekly.com/news/news/soft-on-crime-fighters/5173/ (Ceballos be-
lieved that his supervisors "set aside their ethical obligations to satisfy a request for
prosecution made by the Sheriff's officers.").
123 Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 56.
124 Id.
125 During these discussions, Najera made the following comment to Ceballos,
which Ceballos perceived to be a threat: "You know, if you keep thinking like that,
talking like that, you're going to get yourself in trouble with this office." Id. at *56-57.
126 Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1171.
127 Id.
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tained apparent inconsistencies. 2  The meeting at the Sheriff's
Department changed his perspective. The Lieutenant verbally at-
tacked Ceballos. He turned to Ceballos and started "ranting and
raising his voice saying, 'I don't know who he thinks he is .... He's
more like a defense attorney. He's acting more like a public de-
fender, and I want him off the case.' "1 29 No one defended Cebal-
los; each of his supervisors remained silent.1 3 Following this
encounter Sundstedt indicated that the District Attorney's office
"would not dismiss the case prior to the hearing on the search war-
rant, but would allow the issue to be decided by the judge."''
Ceballos followed the Brady v. Maryland mandate, 3 2 which re-
quires prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence to defendants
in criminal cases, 133 and decided to disclose both versions of his
memo to defense counsel. Although Sundstedt and Najera dis-
couraged his testifying at the traverse hearing, Ceballos believed it
was his duty. Ceballos alleged that when he testified, the prosecu-
tor put up a significant resistance by objecting so often that Cebal-
los was not able to fully disclose his reasons for believing the search
warrant had been invalid. 34 According to Ceballos, following this
hearing Petitioners retaliated against him. 135
128 Joint Appendix, supra note 118, at 35-40.
129 Id. at 45.
130 Id.
131 Brief for the Association of Deputy District Attorneys and California Prosecutors
Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 6, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.
Ct. 1951 (2006) (No. 04-473).
132 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("We now hold that the suppres-
sion by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.").
133 Id. at 87.
134 Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 7.
135 Ceballos maintained that his supervisors retaliated against him in the following
ways:
(1) they demoted him from his position of calendar deputy to that of
trial deputy; (2) Najera "threatened" him when he told her that he
would testify truthfully at the hearing; (3) at the hearing itself Najera
was "rude and hostile" to him; (4) Sundstedt "gave [him] the silent
treatment"; (5) Najera informed him that he could either transfer to
the El Monte Branch, or, if he wanted to remain in the Pomona Branch,
he would be re-assigned to filing misdemeanors, a position usually as-
signed to junior deputy district attorneys; (6) the one murder case he
was handling at the time was reassigned to a deputy district attorney
with no experience trying murder cases; (7) he was barred from han-
dling any further murder cases; and (8) he was denied a promotion.
Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2004).
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B. Procedural History
Ceballos initiated the § 1983 suit against his employers, claim-
ing that he was retaliated against for exercising a right protected by
the First Amendment. Although the United States District Court
for the Central District of California maintained that "[a] t first
blush . . . [Ceballos's] speech clearly involved a matter of public
concern,"'36 the court dismissed Ceballos's suit at the summary
judgment stage 13 7 and held for the defendants as individuals pro-
tected by qualified immunity and as a county protected by Eleventh
Amendment immunity. 13  The court readily acknowledged the
scandal surrounding the Los Angeles Police Department: "For rea-
sons that need not be recited-the code word 'Rampart' says it
all-there can be no doubt that, in Southern California, police mis-
conduct is a matter of great political and social concern to the
community."' 39 Yet, the court read a false dichotomy into the fol-
lowing Supreme Court holding in Connick v. Myers-
[W]hen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters
of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters of
only personal interest.., a federal court is not the appropriate
forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision
taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's
behavior. 140
According to the district court's interpretation, a government em-
ployee cannot be speaking as a citizen when the speech occurs pur-
suant to his or her job duties.' One is either a citizen speaking
upon matters of public concern that do not relate to one's job du-
ties, or one is a public employee speaking upon matters of personal
interest. Another way to understand this distinction is to view the
employee's speech as speech owned by the government. 4 2 The
district court noted the possibility that Ceballos's memo might
have offered information of interest to the Southern California citi-
136 Ceballos v. Garcetti, No. 00-11106, slip op. at 9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2002).
137 Id. at 7, rev'd, 361 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
138 Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1170.
139 Ceballos, No. 00-11106, slip op. at 9.
140 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
141 Ceballos, No. 00-11106, slip op. at 9.
142 In fact, Chief Justice Roberts made this argument regarding Garcetti's speech
during the first round of oral arguments when he stated that he had expected
Garcetti's attorney to argue "that it's speech paid for by the Government, that's what
they pay him for, it's their speech; and so, there's no first-amendment issue at all."
Transcript of Oral Argument, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006) (No. 04-
473). Under this view, "[a]n employee performing a job duty speaks at the em-
ployer's behest and as the employer's mouthpiece." Andrew J. Ruzicho & Louis A.
Jacobs, Employee Speech, 28 No. 12 EMPL. PRAC. UPDATE 1 (2005).
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zenry, but then limited the definition because the speech at issue-
Ceballos's memo-was created "as part of his job."'4 3
On March 22, 2004, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court,'4 4 following its precedent in Roth v. Veterans'Administration of
the United States.145 The court relied upon a constitutional standard
that was stricter than the formulation of the Supreme Court's Con-
nick-Pickering balancing test. As articulated by the Ninth Circuit, a
public employee's speech will generally be considered to touch
upon a matter of public concern, and "only 'when it is clear that
... the information would be of no relevance to the public's evalua-
tion of the performance of governmental agencies' [would the]
speech of government employees receive[ ] no protection under
the First Amendment." 46 The court also heavily weighed Cebal-
los's role as a prosecutor. 1 47 The Ninth Circuit then went on to
balance the speech against the government's efficiency concerns.
Ceballos prevailed, as the government "failed even to suggest dis-
ruption or inefficiency in the workings of the District Attorney's
Office .... 148
The employers argued that speech included in a memoran-
dum is purely of a personal nature, but the court disagreed, noting
that even speech contained in the medium of daily work may be
considered to be of public concern, and thus deserving of First
Amendment protection. 149 The Ninth Circuit's standard offered
strong protection for public employees' speech precisely because
the court believed that those employees, in particular, have access
to information important-and unavailable-to the public.' 50
143 Ceballos v. Garcetti, No. 00-11106, slip op. at 9, 11-12, rev'd, 361 F.3d 1168 (9th
Cir. 2004), rev'd 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
144 Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1185.
145 856 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1988).
146 Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1174 (quoting Ulrich v. City & County of San Francisco, 308
F.3d 968, 978 (9th Cir. 2002)).
147 The Ninth Circuit considered certain contexts and content for speech as inher-
ently deserving of protection, because they will necessarily be of public concern.
"[W]hen government employees speak about corruption, wrongdoing, misconduct,
wastefulness, or inefficiency by other government employees, including law enforce-
ment officers, their speech is inherently a matter of public concern." Id.
148 Id. at 1180.
149 Id. at 1173-75.
150 Id. at 1175.
The right of public employees to speak freely on matters of public con-
cern is important to the orderly functioning of the democratic process,
because public employees, by virtue of their access to information and
experience regarding the operations, conduct, and policies of govern-
ment agencies and officials, are positioned uniquely to contribute to the
debate on matters of public concern.
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Critics of the Ninth Circuit's holding claimed that as "a per se rule
... any on-the-job speech by a public employee is on a matter of
public concern [and thus] the 9th Circuit has undercut the ability
of public employers to limit speech made on their behalf."' 51
Judge O'Scannlain filed a special concurrence, agreeing with
the holding because of stare decisis, but taking issue with the cir-
cuit's continued reliance upon Roth.152 He romanticized about the
era when the Holmes adage 153 was the standard. 154 He drew the
distinction between a public employee speaking in the role of em-
ployee and a public employee speaking in the role of citizen.
1 55
This argument emphasized the difference between "viewpoint-
laden personal speech" and "ordinary job-related speech.' 56
Judge O'Scannlain explained the peculiar separation of identities
as though public employees extinguish their personhood upon en-
tering the workplace: "The problem is that when public employees
speak in the course of carrying out their routine, required employ-
ment obligations, they have no personal interest in the content of
that speech that gives rise to a First Amendment right. Instead,
their speech is, in actuality, the State's."' 5 7 This argument proved
reasonable enough to become Supreme Court precedent.
C. Arguments before the Supreme Court in Ceballos
Ceballos's employers claimed that his speech should be con-
sidered merely job-related and therefore not receive constitutional
protection. 158 Ceballos instead claimed that his speech merited
Id.
151 Thomas E. Wheeler II, Striking a Faustian Bargain: The Boundaries of Public Em-
ployee Free Speech Rights, 50-SEP REs GESTAE, Sept. 2006, at 13, 17-18 (focusing on free
speech in the public-school domain and what he sees as the need for public schools to
limit teachers' speech in order to control how students are taught).
152 Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1185.
153 McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892) ("The petitioner may
have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman.").
154 Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1185.
155 O'Scannlain emphasizes the "distinction between speech offered by an [sic]
public employee acting as an employee in carrying out his or her ordinary employment
duties and speech spoken by an employee acting as a citizen expressing his or her
personal views on disputed matters of public import." Id. at 1186-87.
156 Id. at 1187.
157 Id. at 1189.
158 Petitioners framed the issue in a fashion that described the speech as if it were
unimportant to the general public:
Should a public employee's purely job-related speech, expressed strictly
pursuant to the duties of employment, be blanketed with First Amend-
ment protection simply because it touches on a matter of public concern,
114 [Vol. 11:95
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First Amendment protection because it involved a matter of public
concern. 1
5 9
Garcetti, Sundstedt, Najera, and the County of Los Angeles
("Garcetti") argued three reasons why the Supreme Court should
reverse the Ninth Circuit opinion and find Ceballos's speech to be
unprotected. 60 First, protecting public employees' job-related
speech does not advance the First Amendment. 161 Second, speech
made pursuant to one's job duties should not be covered by the
First Amendment because one is thus speaking merely as an em-
ployee and not as a citizen. 162 And, finally, were the Court to fol-
low the Ninth Circuit's holding, government employers would be
bogged down with "confusion and unpredictability" 16 and the fed-
eral judiciary would be burdened with excessive litigation.164
Garcetti emphasized the potential for litigation by arguing that the
Ninth Circuit created precedent for protecting "all public em-
ployee speech," while deemphasizing the need for the speech's
content to be of interest and concern to the public.1
65
Ceballos responded to Garcetti's argument by stating that the
case law does not discern if the speaker was acting as a citizen as
opposed to an employee, but whether the speech was of public
concern. 6 6 The public matters because the First Amendment pro-
tects not only the speaker, but also the public-as a democracy-at
or should First Amendment protection also require the speech to be
engaged in "as a citizen," in accordance with this Court's holdings in
Pickeying ... and Connick .. ?
Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at i, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006) (No.
04-473) (emphasis added).
159 Ceballos's issue statement highlights the content of the speech, rather than the
context of its creation: "Does a prosecutor who speaks on a matter of public concern
by reporting suspected police misconduct to his superiors lose his First Amendment
protection against retaliation by his employer solely because he communicated his
message while performing his job?" Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at i.
160 See Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, supra note 158, at ii-iv.
161 Id. at 12.
162 See id. at 32 ("First Amendment protection should be reserved for true citizen
speech because public employees necessarily speak on behalf of the government
when they engage in routine, job-required speech.").
163 Id. at 35.
164 The final reason was articulated in oral arguments before the Court as follows:
The Ninth Circuit's approach, which "affords no consideration for the role of the
speaker as a citizen or an employee . . . plants a seed of a constitutional claim in
virtually every speech that public employees express while carrying out their regular
job duties." Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2005) (No.
04-473). Ceballos was subsequently reargued the following term, with the Supreme
Court ruling in 2006. See supra note 16.
165 Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, supra note 158, at 7.
166 See Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 18.
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large. 167
Ceballos contextualized the speech within the climate of Los
Angeles during the Rampart Scandal.' 68 And then he challenged
Garcetti's characterization of the speech as "routinely prepared.'
'1 69
Ceballos reminded the Court that his speech, the memorandum,
was not a customary job duty,1 7 ° and that, while he felt "ethically
and constitutionally bound to report the deputies' suspected mis-
conduct . . . no policy of the D.A.'s Office required him to do
so." 171 As such, the speech was of tremendous public import and
concern-both to Ceballos as a citizen and to the public at large.1 72
Ceballos posited that the doctrine of public employee free
speech had been interpreted to mean that the speaker is protected
when the speech is on a matter of public concern and does not
outweigh the government's interest, as an employer, in
efficiency.1
73
III. GARCETTI v. CEBALLOS: THE SUPREME COURT OPINION
A. The Majority's Holding
Justice Kennedy authored the majority's opinion, writing that
the "controlling factor in Ceballos' case is that his expressions were
made pursuant to his duties as a calendar deputy.' 1 74 The opinion
agreed with Judge O'Scannlain's special concurrence to the Ninth
167 See id. at 18-19 ("To silence a public employee who seeks to bring to light a
problem in her workplace of public importance both eviscerates that employee's per-
sonal interest in her own speech and subverts the public's interest in holding govern-
ment officials accountable."). In his statement before the House Committee on
Government Reform, Ceballos recognized that "[t] he first amendment protection will
only be afforded if the employee goes outside and holds essentially a press conference
on the front steps of a government building. This is a predicament that is as perverse
as it is illogical. But government employees' action will have another option, an op-
tion that I'm fearful that most will now take, and that is the option to keep quiet, to
look the other way, to feign ignorance of the corruption, the waste, the fraud that
they witnessed. And if this occurs, it is not only the employee that loses, it is the
public that will lose." What Price Free Speech? Whistleblowers and the Ceballos Decision:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Government Reform, 109th Cong. 72 (2006) [hereinafter
Hearings] (statement of Richard Ceballos).
168 Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 1-2.
169 Id. at 4.
170 Id. at 5. When deposed about the memorandum, Ceballos explained that it was
irregular because "[t]his would have been the first deposition report I've ever written
where I was recommending a dismissal or had dismissed a case because of questions
regarding the credibility of a police officer." Id.
171 Id.
172 See id. at 13; see also Hearings, supra note 167, at 73-74.
173 Brief for Respondent, supra note 1, at 12.
174 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1959-60 (2006).
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Circuit's opinion: employees, per se, have no interest in the speech
they make as required by their job.17 5 The majority found that in-
dividuals have insufficient investment in speech made because of a
job duty and thus such speech deserves no protection.176 Ceballos
created another hurdle for plaintiffs: before the Connick threshold
and the Pickering balance, the speaker first must have spoken
outside of a job duty. The opinion first issued a reminder that-
with qualifications-a public employee has the right to "speak as a
citizen addressing matters of public concern. 177 These qualifica-
tions entail a Connick-Pickering analysis to balance the employee's
interest "as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public con-
cern" and the government's interest "as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs . *."..178 Accord-
ingly, as Justice Kennedy wrote, there exist two inquiries: whether
the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern,
and-only if the first answer is yes-whether the government pro-
vided an "adequate justification for treating the employee differ-
ently from any other member of the general public."' 79 Because
the employee may be a teacher, a police officer, a district attorney,
or any other of the myriad roles within government employment,
this task is understandably difficult.
The majority next reiterated the "Court's overarching objec-
tives ' in this doctrine. For one, citizens who enter public em-
ployment necessarily relinquish some freedom. 8 ' This loss
happens in direct response to the government's need for control
over its workforce. What's more, the government's employees have
access to important information, appear to have access to it, or
both. They thus hold "trusted positions in society."18 2 Without
proper control, the government may therefore lose the cohesive
voice of its public policies or operation of its functions.183
To flesh out its concerns, the Court also spoke to the First
Amendment rights that citizens retain. The First Amendment will
reign in public employers who try to use the rules of the workplace
to infringe on those rights. 184 When the employee is speaking as a
175 Id. at 1960.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 1957.
178 Id. (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
179 Id. at 1958.
180 Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. at 1958.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.
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citizen on matters of public concern, then the government may
only limit those rights as is needed to operate an efficient and ef-
fective workplace. 8 5 And the Court's final objective is to serve the
public's interest in remaining informed. Before addressing Cebal-
los's and Garcetti's arguments, Justice Kennedy closed this sum-
mary of the doctrine as it stood before the Ceballos decision by
stating that, while First Amendment protections are important for
both the individual and the public at large, they do not "empower
[public employees] to 'constitutionalize the employee griev-
ance.' "186
The striking point for the majority-"the fact that Ceballos
spoke as a prosecutor fulfilling a responsibility to advise his supervi-
sor about how best to proceed with a pending case"-would not
change if Ceballos received any personal gratification.18 v Ceballos
was not a citizen when he spoke those words-the argument
goes-simply because he was a worker, regardless of his individual
investment in the work. Citizen and worker are thus mutually ex-
clusive. According to the majority, one may not contemporane-
ously fill the roles of worker and citizen. Because Ceballos's speech
was made in his role as prosecutor, his speech had no corollary to a
citizen's speech, and so restricting this speech could not restrict
Ceballos's First Amendment right.'88 The way the Court saw it,
Ceballos's employers were merely controlling the expression they
hired Ceballos to create.
Justice Kennedy made a point that Justice Souter highlighted
in his dissent as a potential problem. Essentially, Ceballos retained
his rights as a citizen because he could have entered the speech,
unprotected as work product, into "civic discourse." Ceballos
would then be acting as a citizen and could receive First Amend-
ment protection. 89 Justice Kennedy disputed the Ninth Circuit's
concern that his allowance would create a doctrinal anomaly: the
same, unprotected speech would be protected if spoken to the
185 Id.
186 Id. at 1959 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1986)).
187 Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. at 1960. In his dissent, Justice Souter described this speech
differently: "[w]ould anyone deny that a prosecutor like Richard Ceballos may claim
the interest of any citizen in speaking out against a rogue law enforcement officer,
simply because his job requires him to express a judgment about the officer's per-
formance?" Id. at 1965 (Souter, J., dissenting).
188 Id. at 1961 ("When a public employee speaks pursuant to employment responsi-
bilities... there is no relevant analogue to speech by citizens who are not government
employees.").
189 Id. at 1960.
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public.19 ° He wrote that the Ninth Circuit misunderstood the pre-
cedent: Pickering's letter to the newspaper was protected because
it was the kind of activity in which one who does not work for the
government may also engage.' Furthermore, public employers
have the choice to create internal venues for voicing complaints so
that employees will be encouraged to voice concerns privately.
192
Justice Kennedy underscored the government's interest in
controlling employee speech and the federalism policy of keeping
the judiciary out of employment decisions. The slippery slope ar-
gument here is that allowing independent review of Ceballos's case
"would be to demand permanent judicial intervention in the con-
duct of governmental operations .... 193 The specter of judicial
oversight threatens more frightfully than that of silenced
whistleblowers.
Before ending the opinion, Justice Kennedy addressed two
concerns from Justice Souter's dissent: that a public employer will
be able to restrict the free speech of its employees by broadening
their job descriptions, 94 and that the Ceballos opinion will bleed
over to affect constitutional protections of public school teachers'
academic freedom. 9 ' First, Justice Kennedy argued, what an "offi-
cial job duty" entails will not be defined merely by a job descrip-
tion, but by an active, practical inquiry. 96 Second, he recognized
that more than employee-speech jurisprudence is implicated by is-
sues surrounding academic freedom and so did not need to be ex-
plored in this opinion.'97 Finally, the majority side-stepped the
190 Id. at 1961.
191 Id.
192 See id. ("A public employer that wishes to encourage its employees to voice con-
cerns privately retains the option of instituting internal policies and procedures that
are receptive to employee criticism.").
193 Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. at 1961.
194 Id. Justice Souter wrote, "I am pessimistic enough to expect that one response
to the Court's holding will be moves by government employers to expand stated job
descriptions to include more official duties and so exclude even some currently pro-
tectable speech from First Amendment purview." Id. at 1965 n.2 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
195 Id. at 1962 (referencing Justice Souter's dissent, id. at 1969-70).
196 Id. at 1961-62.
197 Id. at 1962. Justice Souter responded that placing a factual inquiry at this point
in the analysis may still increase litigation, as the judiciary must decide what actions
occur pursuant to an employee's official job duties. Id. at 1965 n.2 (Souter,J., dissent-
ing). Critics also disagreed with Justice Kennedy here. "[T]he ramifications of this
holding on public employees within the academic arena are not likely to go away as
quietly as Justice Kennedy implies." Krystal LoPilato, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Public Employ-
ees Lose First Amendment Protection for Speech Within TheirJob Duties, 27 BERKELEvJ. EMP. &
LAB. L. 537, 543 (2006).
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issue of the important information would-be whistleblowers might
now be discouraged from exposing by making a controversial state-
ment as though it were fact: public employers will use sound judg-
ment to listen to criticisms from their employees and those
employees will be supported by "the powerful network of legislative
enactments" available to whistleblowers. 198
The majority's categorical separation of speech into speech
made as required by work and speech made of one's own volition
triggered dissents. The dissents focused on the creation of a false
bifurcation-an individual becomes a worker when thus defined by
ajob description and a citizen when not-and the repercussions to
public debate, a central tenet of First Amendment jurisprudence.
B. The Dissents
The majority opinion provoked three dissents: Justice Stevens
wrote a brief dissent; Justice Souter provided a more substantial
dissent,joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg; andJustice Breyer
added his own dissent as well.
Justice Stevens dissented, pointing out that the First Amend-
ment will "[s]ometimes" protect a public employee from speech
made pursuant to official duties, "not '[n] ever."" 99 What happens
when a supervisor wants to silence an employee, not because the
employee is disrupting or misstating the government's position,
but because the employee is revealing "facts that the supervisor
would rather not have anyone else discover?"2 ° In order to pro-
tect against the silencing of whistleblowers, Justice Stevens rejected
the "categorical difference" between speaking pursuant to one's
job duties and speaking as a citizen. 20 1 That separation could fail
to protect an employee who, regardless of the fact that his or her
speech was articulated by a job description, nevertheless revealed
governmental misconduct or waste.20 2
Justice Stevens pointed out a possible backlash to the major-
ity's holding: public employees, to ensure protection, may reach
outside of the workplace to speak because they would then be
198 Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. at 1962.
199 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
200 Id.
201 Id. at 1963. Justice Stevens noted that the use of ajob description to define a
constitutional right does not conform to the Court's precedents: "We had no diffi-
culty recognizing that the First Amendment applied when Bessie Givhan . . . raised
concerns .... Our silence as to whether or not her speech was made pursuant to herjob duties demonstrates that the point was immaterial." Id.
202 Id.
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deemed to be speaking as citizens and would thus retain their First
Amendment rights.20 3 He closed his dissent by describing the ma-
jority's opinion with the following pejoratives: "novel" and
"misguided."2
"
4
Justice Souter's dissent-joined by Justices Stevens and Gins-
burg-argued that the majority drew an arbitrary line when it
placed speech made pursuant to one's official job duties outside of
First Amendment protection.20 5 This is because "[n]othing ... ac-
countable on the individual and public side of the Pickering balance
changes when an employee speaks 'pursuant' to public duties. "206
He focused on the speech's recipients and the interests served by
the speech at issue: "addressing official wrongdoing and threats to
health and safety. ' 207 These public and private interests exist even
when the information becomes available by way of a public em-
ployee's job fulfillment.208 In fact, the value of such speech may be
greater than speech not made pursuant to one's job duties because
it is "a subject [the employee] knows intimately for the very reason
that it falls within his duties. '20 9 A government employee is still a
citizen, and "protection of public employees who irritate the gov-
ernment... [flows] from the First Amendment because a govern-
ment paycheck does nothing to eliminate the value of an
individual speaking on public matters .... "210 Accordingly, al-
though the weight given either side may shift, the Pickering balance
does not disappear when the speech occurs pursuant to one's job
duties.
Justice Souter addressed the government's countervailing in-
terest in maintaining an efficient and smooth operation, but noted
that the majority's bright-line rule offered a strange concession.211
He referenced holdings in the Court's line of public employee free
speech cases that recognized how a worker for the government can
act "not merely as one of its employees but also as a concerned
citizen, seeking to express his views on an important decision of his
203 Id.
204 Id. Here Justice Stevens used "novel" to imply that the Court-rather than fol-
lowing its own precedent-created new law.
205 Id. at 1964-65 (Souter, J., dissenting).
206 Id. at 1967.
207 Id. at 1963.
208 Id. at 1965.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 1964.
211 Id. at 1965 ("[T]here is no adequate justification for the majority's line categori-
cally denying Pickering protection to any speech uttered 'pursuant to .. . official du-
ties.'") (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 1960 (majority opinion)).
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government. '212 As stated earlier, Justice Souter argued that noth-
ing changes on the "individual and public side" of the Pickering bal-
ance when the speech occurs pursuant to official duties; however,
he did agree with the majority that such speech might have the
capacity to use its "greater leverage to create office uproars and
fracture the government's authority to set policy to be carried out
coherently through the ranks."213 Yet, Justice Souter did not see
this possibility as sufficient justification for categorically excluding
such speech from First Amendment protection.
Justice Souter tackled the majority's fear of increased litiga-
tion.214 He first offered a way to recalibrate the Pickering scale
when the employee speaks pursuant to his official job duties: the
content must be of "unusual importance" and the speaker must
satisfy "high standards of responsibility in the way" the speech is
disseminated. 215 He also pointed out that the Ninth Circuit's expe-
rience with public employee free speech suits demonstrates that a
"debilitating flood of litigation" is not opened just by protecting
public employee's job-related speech. 2 16 What's more, the major-
ity's current rule might increase litigation with fact-based questions
centering on what speech falls within an employee's duties.2 1 7 Jus-
tice Souter warned that future employment descriptions may ex-
pand to protect the government against litigation from disgruntled
former employees who claim that they were subject to an adverse
employment action based on protected speech. 218
What about when the government dictates the actual words to
be spoken? Justice Souter addressed the majority's contention that
the government owns the words themselves and distinguished
Ceballos's speech from instances where the government funds the
dissemination of one viewpoint or policy. 219 Following Rust v. Sulli-
van, the majority conflated Ceballos's speech with governmental
policy advertised through its employees. Ceballos's speech, rather
than espousing one viewpoint or applauding one policy, included
the work product of a prosecutor who investigated numerous crim-
inal and non-criminal activities. In order to enforce the law, Cebal-
212 Id. at 1964 (quoting City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Emp.
Rel. Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 (1976)).
213 Id. at 1967.
214 Id. at 1967-68 n.5.
215 Id. at 1967.
216 Id. at 1968.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 1965 n.2.
219 Id. at 1969.
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los had to remain flexible, and not "speak from a government
manifesto. 22 ° Souter also repudiated the majority's reliance on
whistleblower protections, which-instead of the strong network
hailed by Justice Kennedy-he described as a "patchwork.
2 1
Justice Breyer filed his own dissent. While he agreed that
Ceballos's case should have been provided a Pickering balance, he
disagreed with the analysis supporting the other dissents. He pur-
sued two lines of reasoning thus far unreviewed by the Court in
Ceballos. First, Ceballos spoke as an attorney and so faced the inde-
pendent limitations set by lawyers' professional canons.222 The
government's interest in quieting speech, therefore, is reduced by
this professional requirement. Second, the government also has a
constitutional responsibility to require government prosecutors to
disclose exculpatory information to defendants' attorneys.22 Be-
cause of these two special circumstances, Justice Breyer believed
that the balancing test should have been applied.
Justice Breyer departed from Souter's dissent in the procedure
for adjudicating cases such as Ceballos's, stating that he would give
more credence to efficiency concerns and that the adjusted test
casts too wide a net.224 His offered correction would rely on
whistleblower statutes for areas that those statutes cover.2 2 5
IV. CONCLUSION: WHY THE MAJORITY GOT IT WRONG
As the doctrine now stands, when a public employee speaks
pursuant to official job duties, she cannot be speaking as a citizen.
Because she is not speaking as a citizen, she is unprotected by the
First Amendment. This unsubtle argument ignores the employee
who retains her citizen's conscience while at work. It also faintly
echoes Justice Holmes's insistence that one may have the right to
speak out, but one doesn't have the right to public employment:
now one may have the right to speak out, but one doesn't have the
right to speak out "pursuant to official job duties."
Must public employees check their individuality at the door?
One critic of the Ninth Circuit's approach claimed that public em-
ployees are engaged in a Faustian bargain: for the glamour and
money from public employment, one must give up her free speech
220 Id.
221 Id. at 1970.
222 Id. at 1974 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
223 Id.
224 Id. at 1975.
225 Id. at 1976.
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rights. 226 This dichotomy-Erwin Chemerinsky, a noted constitu-
tional scholar, called it "a false and unprecedented distinction be-
tween individuals speaking as 'citizens' and as 'government
employees' "-gives one the mental picture of automatons at
work. 227
When, exactly, is one a citizen and when is one an employee?
The Court's holding should have recognized this tension and con-
tinued to protect employees based upon the "content, form, and
context" of their speech; not narrowed the protection to the pa-
rameters of their job descriptions. 228 As it now stands, public em-
ployee free speech is a misnomer: one cannot be acting as a public
employee when receiving free speech protection. Speech is only
protected when one is being a citizen and not an employee.
Within one month of the Court's decision, the House Com-
mittee on Government Reform was investigating how the decision
affected whistleblower protections,229 with the hope that legislation
would fill in the space where the First Amendment used to protect
public employees.23 ° On March 14, 2007, the House of Represent-
atives passed the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act,
which would, for example, increase protection for federal contrac-
tor employees, expand whistle blower protections to Transporta-
tion Security Administration airport screeners, other intelligence
agency employees, and federal scientists. 231 Perhaps more impor-
tantly, the Act would provide access to any federal courts, address-
ing the Federal Circuits' weakening of existing protections for
federal employees. 23 2 Additionally, the bill would cover both for-
mal and informal communications by federal employees, 233 an im-
226 See Wheeler, supra note 151.
227 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Kennedy Court, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 335, 340 (2006).
228 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 146, 147-48 (1983).
229 See Hearings, supra note 172, at 55-60 (statement of Roger Pilon, Director of the
Center for Constitutional Studies, Cato Institute). Pilon noted that the Court failed
in its attempt to draw new boundaries and that the dissents did not get it right either.
Id.
230 Despite these federal efforts, state protections remain inconsistent. See National
Conference of State Legislatures, State Whistleblower Laws, http://www.ncsl.org/
programs/employ/whistleblower.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2007) ("Although legisla-
tures in all fifty states have enacted whistleblower protection statutes, the measure and
scope of state laws vary greatly."). See also Laurence S. Moy & Nantiya Ruan, When
Good Deeds are Punished: The Legal Landscape of Retaliation and Whistleblowing, 745 PLI/
LIT 581, 616 (2006) (providing information to support a claim that "protections af-
forded victims of retaliation are far from uniform").
231 Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2007, H.R. 985, 110th Cong.
(§§ 11-13) (addressing contractors in § 11; TSA in § 12; and scientists in § 13).
232 Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act § 10(c)4.
233 Id. § 10(f)1.
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portant amendment in light of Ceballos. On December 17, 2007,
the Senate passed whistleblower legislation that would further en-
hance protection of federal employees. 234 This dual legislation sets
up the possibility of a merger of the two, however the President has
threatened to veto it under the guise of national security235 and for
the time being, access to federal whistleblower protections remains
limited.23
6
Ironically, while denying public employee free speech protec-
tions, Ceballos did reinvigorate the debate surrounding whistle-
blower statutes for public employees-thus adding to the public
discourse that the First Amendment encourages. Ceballos may deny
First Amendment protection to public employees whose speech is
also work, but in the process its holding has provoked an awareness
that whistleblower protections must be strengthened.237 While the
focus of such legislative initiatives has been the protection of fed-
eral employees who make public the fraud and abuse of their em-
ployers, one should not dismiss the perseverance of public speech
as fundamental to democracy.238
234 The Senate unanimously approved legislation to strengthen the Whistleblower
Protection Act for federal government workers. The Senate legislation mitigates the
effects of the Ceballos decision by extending protections to "include a disclosure made
in the ordinary course of an employee's duties .... S. 274, 110th Cong. (2007). See
Government Accountability Project (GAP), Press Release, Senate Approves
Whistleblower Protection Legislation, Dec. 18, 2007, available at http://www.whistle
blower.org/content/pressdetail.cfm?press-id=1 259 (last visited Jan. 17, 2008).
235 Helen Thomas, Editorial, President is Happy to Govern by Veto, SATrLE POST-INTEL-
LIGENCER, Dec. 21, 2007, at B6.
236 See Sonya Bice, Tough Talk from the Supreme Court on Free Speech: The Illusory Per Se
Rule in Garcetti as Further Evidence ofConnick's Unworkable Employee/Citizen Speech Parti-
tion, 8J.L. Soc'y 45, 79 (2007); see alsojamie Sasser, Comment, Silenced Citizens: The
Post-Garcetti Landscape for Public Sector Employees Working in National Security, 41 U.
RICH. L. REv. 759, 761 (2007). The most striking federal legislation of recent years
that seeks to protect federal employees' First Amendment rights in the context of
whistleblowing came in response to the large Enron-type accounting scandals in 2000.
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("SOX") of 2002, which provides increased
protection within the accounting industry for whistleblowers and prohibits employers
from retaliating against any employee who engages in protected activity. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1514A (2002). However, SOX "give [s] the illusion of protection for whistleblowers
without effectively providing it." Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing,
105 MICH. L. REv. 1757, 1757 (2007) (advocating a revision of SOX and comparing
SOX whistleblowing provisions with relevant state and federal statutes).
237 See Press Release, Government Accountability Project, Senate Committee Rein-
troduces Whistleblower Protection Legislation (Jan. 12, 2007), available at http://
www.whistleblower.org/content/press-detail.cfm?press-id=710 (last visited Feb. 25,
2008).
238 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(holding state-mandated loyalty oath for state employees violates due process). "That
our democracy ultimately rests on public opinion is a platitude of speech but not a
commonplace in action. Public opinion is the ultimate reliance of our society only if
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it be disciplined and responsible. It can be disciplined and responsible only if habits
of open-mindedness and of critical inquiry are acquired in the formative years of our
citizens." Id.
